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I.  Introduction 
  Interest in the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) has waxed and waned over the 
years since Robert Mundell’s (1961) pioneering contribution.  Currently stimulated by the 
global currency crises and European Monetary Union (EMU) there is a tremendous 
resurgence of interest in using OCA theory to analyze exchange rate issues.  Unless one 
believes that the recent financial crises were caused primarily by destabilizing speculation,
1 
these crises have little relevance for the choices should be made between fixed and flexible 
rates.  What they do highlight, however, is that high international capital mobility has made it 
increasingly difficult to run compromise systems based on adjustably pegged exchange rate 
regimes.  Thus countries face increased pressure to move toward one or the other ends of the 
fixed versus flexible rate spectrum.  This in turn greatly i ncreases the relevance of OCA 
analysis for policy decisions. 
At the same time there has been increasing technical criticism of the relevance of OCA 
theory in light of developments in macroeconomic analysis and the conditions in emerging 
market economies.  For example, Bofinger, Svindland and Thanner conclude that “the 
traditional literature on optimum currency areas has to be regarded as a relic from the 
Keynesian paradigm” (1993, p.15), while Goldberg, Ickes, and Ryterman “…question the 
relevance of using  optimum currency area arguments for considering the adoption of 
independent currencies in the FSU (Former Soviet Union}” (1994, p.295).   
This paper reviews the recent developments in OCA, both positive and critical, and 
attempts to put them in perspective.  It argues that the recent criticisms do not undermine the 
OCA approach, but as with the positive contributions, add to the number of considerations 
                                                 
1 For a view that this was not the case, see Willett (2000).  With destabilizing speculation genuinely fixed, as 
opposed to adjustably pegged, rates would eliminate the disturbance.   2
that are relevant and influence the weights which should be given to different considerations.  
As a result, the OCA criteria do not always give clear and unambiguous signals about what 
exchange rate regime a country should adopt.  But this should not be any more surprising 
than that economists continue to disagree about optimal macroeconomic policies.  Even 
where we cannot reach agreement about policy recommendations, theory helps us understand 
better why we disagree. 
II. A Perspective on OCA Analysis 
Some economists such as Charles Goodhart (1995) challenged the relevance of any 
economic criteria at all.  Currency area formation they argue is dominated by political 
considerations.  A prime example is that the recent creation of the European Monetary Union.  
While it was sold in part on the inaccurate assertion that monetary union was a necessary step 
to complete the single market, it was motivated overwhelming by political considerations.
2 It 
is arguable that monetary union might be economically efficient for an inner group of EU on 
OCA grounds, but many members of the large EMU clearly do not come close to meeting 
OCA criteria.
3  Rather joining EMU became seen by politicians as the distinction between 
first and second class European citizenship. 
Political considerations certainly impose important constraints on the relevance of 
applications of OCA analysis.  For example, in his original contribution Mundell (1961) 
suggested that on economic grounds it might be desirable to replace the Canadian dollar and 
the US dollar with two new currencies, one for the Eastern regimes of Canada and the US and 
one for their Western regimes.  Recent statistical work by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) 
has supported the basis for this conjecture.  However, this is not a practical suggestion on 
political grounds.  While many countries allow foreign currencies to circulate in their 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Andrews and Willett (1997), Eichengreen and Frieden (1994), and Willett (1994). 
3 See De Grauve  (1992).   3
economics, it is difficult today to imagine a national government allowing the creation of 
multiple domestic currencies. It is true that common currency areas are sometimes split apart 
as nations split apart, as has occurred recently with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, but there 
is little reason to think that OCA considerations played any role in these desolutions.  
Likewise I am not aware of emphasis on OCA considerations in Canadian discussion of 
succession by Quebec. 
Thus for practical purposes we should  pursue OCA analysis from an outward 
perspective with respect to national political units.  Practical political considerations will also 
often limit a country’s options with respect to the terms of joining currency areas.  An issue 
of obvious importance is who determines monetary policy within a common currency area.  
When Austria decided to fix the schilling to the German mark and become a part of the DM 
area, it would obviously have preferred the creation of a new joint currency in whose 
management it had some say.  For this, however, Austria had to await the formation of the 
much broader currency area of the Euro which in turn required a very unusual set of political 
circumstances.  The situation in North America is quite different.  In the near future there is 
no possibility that the United States would agree to combine with Canada and Mexico to 
form a new common currency to complement NAFTA.  As will be discussed below, such a 
position by the US makes sense on OCA grounds, but even if it did not, there would be no 
short on medium term chances of this occurring.  Thus for the foreseeable future the only 
relevant option for Canada, Mexico, and the countries of Central and South America is the 
unilateral joining of the US dollar area through adoption of a hard peg like Austria to the DM, 
a currency broad like Argentina, or dollarization such as Ecuador and El Salvador have 
recently adopted. 
Despite this importance of politics in determining the formation of regional currency 
areas, OCA analysis retains strong  relevance both for normative analysis of the costs of   4
monetary unions
4 and for both positive and normative analysis of the choices of exchange 
rate regimes by individual countries.  The analytic core of OCA theory is its focus on the 
factors which influence the relative costs and benefits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates.  
This makes OCA theory relevant for the choice of exchange rate regimes by countries with 
independent currencies, and for this purpose the economic criteria of OCA theory have 
considerable positive explanatory power as well as normative value.
5 
  Another type of criticism is that OCA theory does not lead to a single quantifiable 
criterion.  As the literature developed and more considerations were shown to be relevant, 
some concluded that the OCA approach was a dead end.
6 At the same time other economists, 
such as Tower and Willett (1976), suggested that the incorporation of additional 
considerations showed the power of OCA analysis, not as specific theory, but as an approach 
for thinking about exchange rate issues.  In this view the greatest value of the OCA approach 
is that it demonstrates the fallacy of debating the virtues of fixed versus flexible exchange 
rates in the abstract and focuses attention instead on the factors which influence the relative 
costs and benefits of alternative exchange rate regimes for different countries.  From this 
perspective one should never have expected OCA theory to lead to a single quantifiable 
criterion any more than that macro economic theory would lead to unambiguous strategies for 
optimal monetary and fiscal policies.  Indeed, in his original contribution to the OCA 
literature, Robert Mundell (1961) was careful to note that “the idea of optimality…. is 
complex and difficult to quantify precisely” (p.717) 
                                                 
4 To many economists it seems likely that the EMU’s strategy may backfire, with the economic costs of 
inappropriate memberships in EMU generating more political fiction than cohesion.  See, for example, Feldstein 
(1997), and Willett (1994). 
5 See, for example, Al-Marhubi and Willett (1998) and Bayourni and Eichengreen (1997) and (1998). 
6 See, for example, Ishiyama (1975). For valuable reviews of this and other criticisms of OCA theory, see 
DeGrauwe (1992) and Talvas (1994).     
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III.  The Basic OCA Trade Off 
  Traditional analysis of OCA theory has typically been conceived in terms of balancing 
the micro benefits to be gained by enhancing the usefulness of money by expanding the 
effective domains of individual currencies through currency unification or fixed exchange 
rates against the macroeconomic costs of giving up the exchange rate as an instrument of 
balance of payments adjustment and therefore subjecting domestic macroeconomic policies 
to a binding balance of payments constraint.  As Robert Mundell put it in his original 
development of OCA theory,  
A system of flexible exchange rates is usually presented, by its proponents, as advice whereby depreciation 
can take the place of unemployment when the external balance is in deficit, and appreciation can replace 
inflation when it is in surplus.  (p. 657) 
Against this must be balanced not only the diminution of the usefulness of money 
implied by a greater number of currencies, but also the lower effectiveness of exchange rate 
adjustments in highly open economies. In modern parlance this latter consideration is usually 
discussed in terms of whether changes in nominal exchange rates can have more than fleeting 
effects on real exchange rates.  If not, then the only loss from giving up the freedom to make 
exchange rate adjustment is the possibility of protection from price inflation or deflation 
abroad. 
  In their recent survey of the OCA literature, Masson and Taylor (1993) put the basic 
tradeoff succinctly : 
The value of [monetary] unions clearly derives from the wider circulation of a stable currency; major 
benefits include reducing transaction costs, lowering price and exchange rate variability, and enhancing the 
anti-inflationary credibility of monetary policy… the costs of currency union for a given country involve 
the loss of exchange-rate flexibility, which can be seen as providing an instrument to cushion “shocks” to 
the economy.  The traditional literature on optimum currency areas considers the circumstances in which 
the loss of this instrument is least costly: within currency unions exhibiting high factor mobility and wage   6
price flexibility, for economies that are relatively open, and for countries with a high degree of industrial 
diversification.  (p. 38). 
  As Krugman (1992, 1995) has recently emphasized, most of  the OCA literature has 
focused on the costs of balance of payments adjustments under alternative exchange rate 
regimes.  We know relatively little about the value of the microeconomic benefits from 
broader currency areas other than that the marginal value of expanding currency domain will 
decline as the size of the domain increase. 
  Given the difficulties in quantitatively determining optimality in terms of OCA criteria 
it is perhaps best to begin analysis with the question of whether a currency domain is large 
enough to be viable.  Where an economy is small and highly open there will be little liquidity 
value to the currency.  There would be few nontraded goods and services so a depreciation 
would result primarily in a rise in domestic currency prices –under cutting the effectiveness 
of exchange rate changes in promoting balance of payments adjustment (except through the 
resulting decline in the value of real money balances which could be better accomplished 
through reducing the nominal money supply directly).  With high domestic price variability 
resulting from exchange rate changes the value of the services provided by domestic currency 
would be sharply reduced.  If there is a high level of international currency substitution 
(which a low degree of usefulness of the domestic currency would be likely to produce) than 
a flexible rate would be subject to greater fluctuations and the value of domestic currency 
would be further reduced.  The main factors under cutting the viability of a currency are high 
and variable inflation, high trade ratios, and high degree of dollarization or other forms of 
international currency substitution.
7   
Recently economists such as Hausmann [1999] and Calvo and Reinhart [2000] have 
stressed the  effects of the dollarization of countries financial liabilities as well as their 
currencies.  Such dollarization increases the case for fixed rates, but in many cases such 
liability dollarization may have been artificially high because of the adoption of pegged 
                                                 
7 Note that high openness to international financial flows per se does not have a clear effect on the case for fixed 
or flexible exchange rate.  (See Isard (1995) and Tower and Willett (1976).  What it does unambiguously do, 
however, is make compromise systems more difficult to operate.   7
exchange rates and implicit or explicit government guarantees.  (See Willett (2001)).  While 
the qualitative effects of greater currency substitution and liability dollarization are clear as 
yet there have been no good estimates of the quantitative magnitudes of these effects.  We 
have no formal research literature on how small a viable currency area can be. Global 
monetarists such as Ron McKinnon and Robert Mundell believe that the minimum size for 
OCA’s is quite large, but the relatively successive experiments of tiny economies such as 
Latvia and Slovenia with managed floats suggests that minimum viable sizes may be quite 
small.
8 
Advocates of exchange rate flexibility such as Friedman (1953) and Yeager (1966) 
were quite clear that exchange rate flexibility can only act as a second (or nth) best substitute 
for factor mobility and wage-price flexibility for adjustment to many types of shocks.
9  They 
believed, however, that there were often sufficient rigidities in economies for this second-best 
policy to be useful.  In other words, while under ideal conditions the optimal currency area 
was a single world currency, under actual conditions the optimal number of currency areas 
was much greater. 
In such a world of rigidities in domestic factor mobility and wage and price behavior, 
economic size and openness become a major influence on the costs and benefits of alternative 
exchange rate regimes.  As both Mundell (1962) and McKinnon (1963) emphasized, the 
smaller and more open an economy, the less is the usefulness of its domestic currency and 
because of the high ratio of traded to non-traded goods, the less will be the effects of a given 
change in the nominal exchange rates on the real exchange rate.
10  On the other hand, the 
higher a country’s marginal propensity to import, the less is the domestic real income decline 
                                                 
8 After several years of flexible rates Latvia did adopt a pegged rate, implying that its government did not 
consider flexible rates to be optimal.  Latvia was, however, able to achieve considerable disinflation during its 
flexible rate period. 
9 For recent discussions of the limits of exchange rate adjustment as a substitute for factor mobility and wage-
price flexibility see Bofinger (1994) and Melitz (1995).  Note that while Friedman (1953) has been often 
criticized on the assumption that he advocated flexible exchange rates for all countries, no matter how small; 
this was in fact not the case. He explicitly noted the problems of flexible exchange rates for tiny countries and 
thus was a precursor of OCA theory. For references to other precursors, see Tower and Willett (1976). 
10 While Mundell has become generally associated with the labor mobility criterion and McKinnon (1963) with 
this openness criterion, Mundell also explicitly discussed openness, and this is appropriately noted in 
McKinnon’s contribution   8
required to achieve any given required improvement in the trade balance.  Thus the smaller 
and more open is an economy, the more attractive is the cost benefit ratio of fixed exchange 
rates. 
  This is easy to see intuitively.  A major aspect of the issue of the desirability of fixed 
versus adjustable exchange rates is whether given a shock that creates a conflict between 
internal (domestic macroeconomics) and external (balance of payments) balance, t he 
domestic sector should be adjusted to the external sector as would have to occur under fixed 
exchange rates or the external sector should be forced to adjust to the domestic sector, as 
would occur with exchange rate adjustments.  Obviously an important part of the answer lies 
in the relative size of the two sectors, i.e. the openness of the economy.  Thus it makes 
considerable sense for small countries like Estonia to fix their exchange rates while large 
economies like the US and Japan adopt flexible rates.  In the North American context, this 
implies the prospective benefits for fixing exchange rates are much greater for Canada and 
Mexico than for the US.  Thus while the US would likely have no objection to policies by 
Canada and Mexico to fix their currencies to the US dollar, the US would be unlikely to favor 
the creation of a new common currency for all three countries. 
  The importance of a third consideration, industrial structure, was pointed to by Kenen 
(1967), who argued that if economies were highly diversified, they were less likely to be 
subject to shocks which would require a major of adjustments and hence would have less 
need for exchange rate adjustment.  This has lead to a broad body of literature that will be 
discussed below. 
IV.  Expansion of the Criteria 
  Over time the list of considerations analyzed in the OCA literature has continued to 
grow.  In a recent survey article, Talvas (1993) listed nine characteristics from the traditional 
literature: similarity of inflation rates, the degree of factor mobility, the openness and size of   9
the economy, the degree of commodity diversification, price and wage flexibility, the degree 
of goods market integration, fiscal integration, real exchange rate variability, and political 
factors-before going to discuss a number of additional considerations that have been raised in 
the “new” OCA theory.  And this list omitted the range of shocks analyzed by Tower and 
Willett (1976) Aghelvi et al (1991) and emphasized in the surveys by Masson and Taylor 
(1993; 1994). 
  Looking only at the recent surveys by Bofinger (994), Masson and Taylor (1993; 
1994), Talvas (1993; 1994) and Wihlborg and Willett (1991), one finds added to the list of 
considerations factors such as optimal public finance, the degree of international currency 
substitution, the new classical view of policy ineffectiveness, the informativeness of price and 
quantity signals from the money and financial markets, controllability of the money supply, 
time inconsistency problems and credibility issues and the case for using institutional 
arrangements to discipline national monetary and fiscal policies.
11 
  Given this proliferation of considerations, attempts to simplify the analysis down to one 
or a few key criteria are quite understandable.  Unfortunately, they have not been successful.  
Arguments initially presented in strong terms as to what is relevant and irrelevant generally 
end up in more modest terms as arguments about shifts in the relative weights which should 
be given to different criteria or the addition of criteria which were originally meant to be 
replacements of other criteria.  A good example is Vaubel’s (1976) intriguing argument that 
the crucial criterion is the variability of a country’s real exchange rate since “real exchange 
rate changes are clearly measurable and automatically give the appropriate weights to the 
economic forces of which they are the result” (p. 440).  While clearly an important variable to 
consider, Vaubel did not convincingly demonstrate that real exchange rate variability 
                                                 
11 Overviews of the issues surrounding the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for monetary policy are 
presented in Westbrook and Willett (1999) and Willett (1998).   10
captured all relevant considerations nor that it necessarily weighted optimally those that it 
does capture.
12 Thus it has become an addition to the other OCA criteria, not a replacement 
for them. 
  Consider two more examples.  In their opening critique of traditional OCA theory as 
being a “Keynesian relic”, Bofinger, Svindland and Thanner (1993) give the impression that 
it should be totally scrapped in favor of their proposed monetarist approach to OCA theory.  
Yet, by the end of their article they quite sensibly refer to the monetary analysis they provide 
as offering “important additional criteria” (p. 29) for OCA theory.  In a similar vein, early on 
in his discussion of Mundell’s factor mobilization criterion, Jacques Melitz (1995) argues 
that, “Mundell’s view belongs to the era of long-run Phillip’s curves and should have been 
abandoned when this notion fell into disrepute in the early seventies” (p.293).  Within the 
following two paragraphs this criticism is appropriately softened to the argument that while 
“Labor mobility will unambiguous improve the merits of a fixed rate” because of “the 
flexibility of prices in the long run, Mundell’s criterion of labor mobility loses much 
plausibility” and “…there is little reason to place labor mobility on a special pedestal in 
analyzing the OCA” (p.293).
13 
  In a similar vein, Masson and Taylor (1994) argue that 
  It is clear from the above discussion that there is no single overriding criterion…Increasingly analytical 
attention has therefore turned to analysis of shocks affecting economies since shock absorption combines 
the net influence of several of the traditional criteria. (p.35)
14 
  This search, however, has not succeeded in developing more easily operationalized 
criteria.  While a shock absorption criterion-like the narrower real exchange rate variability 
                                                 
12 See Bofinger (1994). 
13 There has also been recent criticism of the labor mobility criterion on the grounds that high labor mobility 
may impose substantial social costs.  See Melitz (1995). 
14 One of the major purposes of Tower and Willett (1976) was to integrate more systematically the literature on 
patterns of shocks and optimal exchange rate management into the framework of the OCA approach. 
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criterion-does capture the net effect of several of the traditional criteria, just how it does so is 
not explicitly discussed by Masson and Taylor, nor is this analyzed systematically elsewhere 
in the OCA literature.  Thus how this composite criterion relates to the full range of OCA 
criteria is not yet well understood. 
  As Pilbeam [1991, p.36] has aptly characterized,  
The conclusions of the now vast literature on automatic stabilization under alternative exchange rate 
regimes and policy targets “have proved to be quite complex and the conclusions very sensitive to the 
model specification”.  
As Masson and Taylor (1993; 1994) discuss, one must distinguish whether shocks are 
real or nominal, permanent or temporary, and domestic or foreign. Furthermore, there is the 
question of whether financial market shocks occur primarily with respect to demands for 
money, or domestic interest-bearing assets, or for foreign assets.  Despite the complicated 
nature of this analysis, if countries were persistently hit with only the same single type of 
shock, then the literature could provide a powerful criteria for choosing a particular exchange 
rate regime, i.e., a genuinely fixed or freely flexible exchange rate. However, as Bofinger 
(1994) stresses in his critique of Vaubel’s real exchange rate variability criteria, the pattern of 
past disturbances will not always be a good guide to the pattern of future disturbances. As 
Guitian (1994) argues “…all economies confront both nominal and real shocks. Yet a shift in 
exchange rate regime in response to the nature of shocks is clearly an unworkable 
proposition” (p. 19).  
In the early days of the new classical macroeconomics revolution, the strong policy 
ineffectiveness conclusions from the flexible price rational expectations models undercut the 
traditional rationale for being concerned with using Macro policy to correct the balance of 
payments.  This in turn removed the need for exchange rate adjustments as a mechanism to 
remove balance of payments constraints and hence allow discretionary domestic 
macroeconomic policy. Subsequent theoretical and empirical research has strongly suggested 
that while in the long run one cannot trade off higher inflation for more rapid growth and   12
lower unemployment (indeed, higher inflation will hurt growth over the long run), in the 
short run tradeoffs still exist and thus there is still a plausible (if controversial) case for using 
macro policy instruments to help soften the effects of shocks to the economy.  Thus current 
macroeconomic analysis suggests the prospective gains from independent macroeconomic 
policies are less than implied by traditional Keynesian models, but are still positive. 
Against this must be balanced the increased recognition of the incentives for 
governments to pursue macroeconomic policies which destabilize the economy in order to 
reap political gains (or avoid political losses). Furthermore, even in an economy where the 
strong policy ineffectiveness conclusion held so that price level stability was the only short-
run, as well as long—run, macroeconomic objective, it would not always follow that a fixed 
exchange rate based monetary rule would be the best one to follow. Only if there were price 
level stability abroad and no changes in equilibrium real exchange rates would this be the 
case. Otherwise, using the exchange rate as the economic nominal anchor could lead to 
imported inflation or deflation.
15  Indeed, while it has become common for younger writers to 
think of traditional OCA theory as dealing only with Keynesian unemployment and output 
stability issues, from early on, many of the contributions such as Mundell (1961), McKinnon 
(1963) and Tower and Willett (1976) were concerned with price level stability as well. 
 
V.  Are Exchange Rate Adjustments Ever Effective? 
While one major line of attack on traditional OCA theory has challenged its Keynesian 
macroeconomic origins, another has challenged the effectiveness of exchange rate changes as 
an instrument of policy. In the early postwar period there was considerable elasticity 
pessimism—there were concerns that the responsiveness of quantities to changes in exchange 
rates were so low that the proportional changes in trade volumes would be less than the 
proportional changes in price, and as a result depreciation would lead to a worsening rather 
than an improvement in the trade balance. The empirical research of the last several decades   13
has suggested that this possibility is generally limited to short run J curve effects.  As 
Goldberg, Ickles and Ryternan (1994), argue this can reduce the effectiveness of exchange 
rate changes for short run macroeconomic stabilization policy, but as Willett and Wihlborg 
(1999) point out, this does not undercut the usefulness of exchange rate changes for 
insulation against foreign inflation or as an instrument for longer term balance of payment 
adjustment.   
Recent discussions of the importance of patterns of shocks have sometimes failed to 
distinguish between evaluations on grounds of automatic stabilization and of balance of 
payments adjustment.  Thus, for example, according to standard stabilization analysis 
countries that were out of phase cyclically would make good partners, helping to dampen 
each other’s cycles. Thus temporary asymmetrical shocks would enhance the attractiveness of 
a currency union.  On the other hand where internal adjustment mechanisms worked poorly 
(due to wage and price stickiness and factor immobility), a permanent asymmetric shock 
would force internal macroeconomic adjustments and could be quite costly.
16 
In some cases structural characteristics may give us good clues to patterns of shocks.  
For example, countries where exports are heavily concentrated in agricultural products or raw 
materials are likely to be subject to above average variability in export earnings and thus are 
likely to have greater need for both higher holdings of international reserves and the use of 
exchange rate adjustments.  Likewise, countries with extremely weak domestic political 
institutions and a consequent tendency toward high inflation are likely to have a strong need 
for exchange rate adjustments.  While there are possibilities of using fixed exchange rates to 
promote domestic discipline, this will only work if there is already a considerable basis of 
domestic support  for stabilization.  Otherwise, efforts at fixed rates will break down and 
worsen the economic situation.
17 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 On the other hand, with monetary stability abroad and international currency substitution as the only 
disturbance, a fixed exchange rate would be an optimal monetary rule. See McKinnon (1982). 
16 See Wihlborg and Willett (1999). 
17 See Willett (1998) and Westbrook and Willett (1999).   14
Simple statistical tests of past patterns of shocks, despite their recent popularity in the 
literature, are unlikely by themselves to offer good guidance to future patterns of shocks.  In 
some cases, the combination of such statistical analysis with careful political and economic 
analysis of the causes of these patterns can give good clues to the future, but this is likely to 
be much more relevant to issues of the need for balance of payment adjustment than to the 
automatic stabilization properties of alternative exchange rate regimes.  
Elasticities analysis is based on responses to changes in real exchange rates. Another 
type of critique of the effectiveness of exchange rate adjustments is the view that changes in 
nominal exchange rates will have only quite temporary effects on real exchange rates. 
Analysis of such price feedback effects has been an important component of OCA theory 
from the very beginning. As stressed by both Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), the 
more open is the economy, the greater will be the effects of a devaluation on the domestic 
price level and the greater in turn are the likely induced effects on domestic wages. For a 
highly open economy the exchange rate is typically not an effective instrument because there 
will be little scope for nominal exchange rate changes to have a substantial impact on the real 
exchange rate. Likewise, as has been emphasized in the literature on the vicious circle, the 
more likely are initial domestic wage and price increases to be supported by accommodative 
monetary policy, the less effective will be exchange rate changes in promoting real 
adjustment. 
All this analysis has been standard for decades. What has been new are arguments that 
such considerations apply to relatively large countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy. Since the 1970s, the global monetarists such as Ronald McKinnon, Robert Mundell, 
and Arthur Laffer have argued that global integration has reached a point where all countries, 
no matter their size, are functionally small open economies. This view is highly controversial 
and has won only a limited number of converts (myself not included). Over the past decade, 
however, the increasing economic integration within Europe has contributed to the frequent 
espousal of this view by advocates of European monetary union. If exchange rate adjustments 
are no longer effective, anyway, then the costs of joining a monetary union are substantially   15
reduced they argue. 
This view has been greatly oversold, however. The substantial devaluations and 
depreciations of the British pound, the Italian lira, and the Swedish krona following the 
1992— 1993 European monetary crisis led to substantial sustained changes in real exchange 
rates. An important reason was that these depreciations were not accompanied by monetary 
accommodation, but this merely makes the point that exchange rate changes are not a 
substitute for sound domestic policies. 
The recent empirical literature has found mixed results for some Western European 
countries, but overall it suggests that nominal exchange rate changes will have a substantial 
impact on real exchange rates for policy relevant time periods for most European countries.
18 
Likewise, there appears to be considerable scope for nominal exchange rate changes to 
meaningfully affect the real exchange rate in many developing countries, as has been 
illustrated by the recent Asian currency depreciations.  The evidence seems clear that in 
general there is still scope for the exchange rate to be a useful policy instrument and that its 
effectiveness needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis along the lines suggested by OCA 
theory, i.e., the smaller and more open is the economy, the stronger is the case for adopting a 
fixed exchange rate. 
History can also be important. The more depreciation is associated with inflation in the 
minds of the public, the less effective and more costly are exchange rates changes likely to 
be.  Even where public perceptions are due to false guilt by association, these perceptions can 
affect the short-term effects of depreciation on inflationary expectations and the degree of 
sense of crisis.  These in turn can greatly complicate the tasks of currency and 
macroeconomic stabilization.  Thus on these grounds exchange rate adjustments are likely to 
be more effective for Canada than for Mexico.  Indeed throughout much of Latin America 
historical tendencies toward high inflation have increased the effects of depreciations on 
inflationary expectations above what one would expect on the basis of trade openness alone.  
                                                 
18 See the analysis and references in Mast (1996) and Pappell (1994) . For the United States the evidence is 
overwhelming.   16
On the other hand, despite adverse history, the accompanying strong monetary and fiscal 
policy actions kept both Mexico’s depreciation in 1995 and Brazil’s recent depreciation from 
being undermined by induced inflation. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
 One problem which is receiving increased alternative is that of appropriate partners for 
countries that want to fixed their exchange rates.  Ideally one would like to choose a partner 
or set of partners with which one has a high proportion of trade and which is likely to be 
relatively stable.  Sometimes these criteria conflict however.  Consider, for example, the 
recent experiences of the Russian ruble and the Baltic States. All three of the Baltic States—
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania— are small open economies that had Russia as their dominant 
trading partner. With rampant inflation in Russia, however, it would have been economic 
folly for these countries to fix their currencies to the ruble, even apart from their strong 
political disincentives to do so.
19   Many countries such as New Zealand have no dominant 
trading partner.  Often in developing countries, countries with geographic proximity do not 
have high levels of  trade with each other, making adoption of a regional currency less 
attractive.  This was the case with the Baltic States.  Thailand presents a vivid recent example 
of the problems that can be generated by fixing your exchange rate to a currency (the dollar) 
with which trade was relatively limited.  Thus Austria was quite fortunate to have Germany 
as a close trading partner. 
  On these criteria, both Canada and Mexico score well above average, having a high 
proportion of their trade with the United States, a country that has had one of the most stable 
macroeconomies in the post war period.  There are still substantial problems on this score, 
however, because the United States has had huge fluctuations in the dollar against both the 
yen and the European currencies.  Thus while stabilizing for a large proportion of trade, 
                                                 
19 At first glance it might seem that the Baltic states were logical candidates to form a currency area among 
themselves. This was not the case, however. Apart from political differences that made such bonding 
unattractive, they had surprisingly small amounts of trade with one another. In this case, close geographic 
proximity was not accompanied by substantial economic integration.   17
fixing to the US dollar by Canada, Mexico, or the countries of Central and south America 
could be quite destabilizing for a nontrivial portion of trade and investment. 
  Another point emphasized  in recent OCA literature is that the initiation of currency 
areas may itself affect such factors as the level of trade openness, the country and product 
composition of international trade, the discipline of monetary and fiscal policies and the 
flexibility of wages and prices.  In other works the OCA criteria are endogenous.
20  In most 
cases these will move countries closer to meeting OCA criteria.  Thus if a country is close to 
meeting the criteria ex ante, it may be wise to go ahead on the basis of the prediction that the 
criteria will indeed be meet expost.  It would be dangerous to assume substantial rapid 
changes, however.  For example, while some economists have argued that because fixed 
exchange rates would increase the costs of wage and price rigidities the creation of EMU will 
generate strong pressures to increase wage and price flexibility.  This ignores, however, the 
public choice insight that politically powerful groups usually benefit from these rigidities and 
will be loath to give them up.  This will often dominate the effects of aggregate economic 
ineffectiveness in the operation of this political process.  Thus, for example, while 
Argentina’s currency board does appear to have led to an increase in wage and price 
flexibility after also a decade the amount of increase has not been sufficient to eliminate high 
unemployment.  Thus I am quite skeptical about how much increased wage and price 
flexibility it is reasonable to assume that joining as a currency area will produce. 
  It is sometimes not recognized that the OCA framework is relevant not just to the 
choice of exchange rate regime, but also the management of macroeconomic policies under 
flexible exchange rates.  Specifically the more open is the economy, the greater is the weight 
that should be g iven to developments in the foreign exchange market in setting domestic 
monetary and fiscal policies.  Given that the weight of the available empirical evidence 
suggests that the adverse effects of flexible rates on international trade and investment are not 
enormous, it would likely be wise under uncertainly to adopt a risk adverse bias against 
adopting permanently fixed exchange rates or a common currency.  The same bias would not 
                                                 
20 See Frankel and Rose (1998)   18
apply, however, to the choice of how much weight to give to external sector development in 
the formulation of national monetary and fiscal policies.  On these grounds I suspect that it 
would be wise for Canada, Mexico and most other countries in Latin America to continue 
their flexible exchange rate regimes but to give considerable weight to the behavior of their 
currencies against the US dollar in setting their macroeconomic policies.
21 
                                                 
21 Both Canada and Mexico have recorded substantial increases in their trade ratios in recent years.  From 1990 
to 1997 Canada’s average ratio of exports and imports to GDP rose from a little over 25 percent to almost 40 
percent. Over the same period Mexico’s ratios rose from a little over 19 percent to over 30 percent.  Exports of 
both countries are highly concentrated on the US, running about 80 percent for Canada and a few percentage 
points higher for Mexico.  Imports are a little more diversified, with about 2/3 of Canada’s imports coming from 
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